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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
Dairy enterprises are the “white gold” of many developing countries, creating 
pathways out of poverty while boosting human nutrition and health, crop farming and 
natural resource management. Demand for milk and other dairy products is increasing 
in many parts of the developing world. Small-scale farmers and traders are at the heart 
of this sector. The challenge for policymakers is to encourage small-scale operators to 
share in this growing market while ensuring that poor consumers enjoy safe and 
affordable dairy products. (ILRI, 2006).  
 
However, inappropriate regulations have been identified as the most important factor 
that constrains enterprise development in developing countries (Pfeffermann, 2001). 
Kenya provides a prime example of inappropriate regulations that affect informal milk 
trade. Here, even though indigenous dairy markets predominate, public officials have 
actively discouraged them in the past. This is in spite of the many benefits associated 
with the sector, such as affordable milk for poor consumers, satisfaction of traditional 
tastes and better prices for producers. 
 
Kenya has a relatively high demand for milk; per capita milk consumption of 80-100 
kg liquid milk equivalent is four to five times greater than that of other countries in the 
region. This implies good opportunities for enhanced income generation for the 
thousands of Kenyan smallholder dairy producers and their small-scale traditional rural 
and urban market intermediaries.  
 
The regulations against indigenous dairy milk markets were largely based on perceived 
quality and safety concerns. However, there was little factual information on the safety 
of traditionally marketed milk mainly because the national authorities responsible for 
implementing regulations relied on western models based on costly cold-chain 
pathways and pasteurization, ignoring the fact that many resource-poor consumers 
refuse to pay the extra costs thus incurred and prefer to buy raw milk and boil it 
themselves.  
 
In order to amend the regulations and standards that had negative impacts on small-
scale milk markets, there is need to quantify the benefits accrued via this sector. 
Besides direct benefits of employment and income generation for milk traders, 
improving small-scale milk markets is expected to improve market access, generate 
more income for producers and provide cheaper milk products to consumers. The 
Kenyan dairy development authorities, therefore, urgently require more information as 
a basis on which to develop locally-derived regulations and standards of dairy safety 
assurance that also define the required institutional and technical changes and trade-
offs. 
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It is against this background that the Kenya Smallholder Dairy Project (SDP)1 
channelled part of its research efforts to contribute to much-needed policy changes in 
the Kenya dairy sector. The results generated by the project pinpointed a basic problem 
in dairy development in Kenya: the need to recognize and develop the informal sector 
that markets most of the milk in Kenya2.  
 
Key observations and conclusions with regard to the need to reform the policy 
environment relating to milk marketing while safe-guarding the public from exposure 
to milk-borne health hazards in Kenya were as follows:  
• A supportive policy environment is needed to aid the development of the 
Kenya dairy industry. 
• The revised policy and legislation need to take full account of broader 
national goals (such as creation of employment and poverty reduction) and the 
reality of systems operating in the dairy sector.  
• Most raw milk traders operate outside the regulatory environment and are not 
licensed. However, licensed traders show no significant difference in milk 
quality from the majority of smaller, unlicensed milk traders. 
• Training of raw milk traders leads to clear improvements in milk quality and 
such training would be most effective within a licensing system that allows the 
monitoring of accredited business development service providers. 
• The universal consumer practice of boiling purchased milk means that the 
health risks from all marketing channels are minimal. 
• The pace of review of relevant national policy and legislation needs to be 
speeded up. 
 
In working towards a pro-poor dairy policy shift, the core institutions that implemented 
the SDP worked closely with local civil society organizations (CSOs). The multi-
institutional partnership elaborated these scientific facts in various reports and policy 
briefs and used them in a series of communications events that led to a shift towards a 
pro-poor policy stance by Kenyan government officials.  
 
Although the resulting changes in national policy are still in the legislative process, 
changes in attitude and behaviour of key actors toward the informal milk market can 
already be observed at national and grassroots levels. Relevant government officials 
have since embarked on processes to formalize the small-scale milk trade sector. One 
key piece of evidence for this change in attitude is an on-going pilot project led by the 
national dairy regulator, the Kenya Dairy Board (KDB), to test new institutional 
mechanisms to formalize small-scale milk trading.  
 
 
                                                 
1 The Smallholder Dairy Project was a collaborative research and development project undertaken by the 
Ministry of Livestock and Fisheries Development, the Kenya Agricultural Research Institute (KARI) and the 
International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI) between 1997 and 2005. 
2 See various reports at the SDP website www.smallholderdairy.org. 
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1.2 Policy context and question 
Before the Dairy Industry Act (Cap 336) was enacted in 1958, traditional milk 
marketing in Kenya was largely unregulated. The Act was introduced mainly to protect 
the interests of the expanding large-scale settler dairy producers and, despite huge 
changes in its structure since then, the Kenyan dairy industry is to a large extent still 
regulated by that Act today.  
 
In 1964, milk quotas were abolished and the Kenya Cooperative Creameries (KCC) 
became accessible to all farmers, as long as their milk was of acceptable quality. KCC 
thus became a guaranteed market for raw milk, as it bought any amount of milk 
supplied by farmers, regardless of demand. However, by the early 1980s, the highly 
subsidized input services that had been in place had become unsustainable. 
Liberalization of the dairy industry started in the mid-1980s, with full price decontrol 
by 1992. KCC, and the new processors who entered the market, now set the price of 
milk. This heralded the gradual collapse of KCC through the 1990s. 
 
Since then, the dairy sub-sector has witnessed several major changes in the delivery of 
services and marketing of milk. The collapse of KCC effectively ended its monopoly on 
milk processing and marketing in the lucrative, high-demand urban areas of Kenya. 
This gap was quickly filled by a proliferation of small-scale, illegal, informal milk 
traders and large-scale, licensed and regulated, private sector milk processors and 
packers. The small-scale traders sold raw milk while their large-scale counterparts sold 
packaged, pasteurized or ultra-heat treated milk and other processed dairy products.  
 
Although the sale of raw milk in urban areas was illegal, high consumer demand for 
raw milk meant that the number of small-scale milk vendors (SSMVs) serving various 
parts of Nairobi and other urban areas in Kenya soon reached tens of thousands. It 
became virtually impossible for the KDB to control them, and the private dairy 
companies came to regard the untaxed, unregulated and unlicensed SSMVs as unfair 
competition.  
 
The SSMVs bought milk from smallholder dairy farmers. Most of these milk vendors 
operated from fixed premises but some were mobile. Plastic containers were 
predominantly used and milk was transported to urban centres by bicycle or public 
transport. Most traders delivered milk to specific customers but some also retailed it in 
the open market. The milk traders had good networks amongst themselves and mainly 
operated early in the morning, partly in response to demand from consumers but also 
to avoid harassment by KDB inspectors.  
 
Although the dairy industry has been dominated by small-scale production and 
marketing from the 1990s to the present, this has been in a policy environment that 
interpreted the informal market as illegal. Since 1995, the government has been trying 
to reform the legal and policy framework to better reflect the way the industry has 
developed, although with little progress before the SDP started in 1997.  
 
Poverty reduction and employment generation are important goals in various 
development strategies and policies in Kenya including the recent Recovery Strategy 
for Wealth and Employment Creation (RSWEC, 2003–2007) and the Strategy for 
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Revitalizing Agriculture (SRA, 2004–2014). These documents recognize that dairy 
activities generate many employment opportunities in the course of milk production, 
processing and marketing.   
 
Approximately 6 million litres of milk is traded daily in Kenya through formal and 
informal milk marketing pathways. Thus, beyond the farm level, processing and 
marketing of milk and other dairy products offer numerous employment and income-
earning opportunities for the various participants in the milk supply chain, such as 
transporters, mobile milk traders, milk bars and shops/kiosks.   
 
It has been shown that dairy production, marketing and consumption are 
predominantly driven by consumer demand. Consumers show a clear demand for 
unprocessed milk, based on affordability, availability and taste. In turn, this demand 
has supported the maintenance of a strong market for unprocessed milk with a variety 
of informal milk market agents. Most smallholder dairy producers, therefore, sell their 
milk into this market whereas others sell through chains that supply the processors. 
This makes SSMVs an important milk outlet for smallholder milk producers. A policy 
that affects any level of the milk supply chain will therefore have an impact not only on 
the players at that particular level but on all the players along the supply chain, 
including producers, marketers, processors and consumers.   
 
The SDP had significant policy impacts, particularly in the area of changing 
perceptions and policies towards small-scale milk traders and agents (Leksmono et al., 
2006). Although the reforms initiated by the SDP have not yet been officially 
formalized and the supply of raw milk to scheduled areas is still technically illegal, a 
marked change in attitude and implementation has already taken place, particularly by 
KDB officials.  
 
There have also been repeated official public announcements by the Ministry of 
Livestock and Fisheries Development (MoLFD) and KDB emphasizing the plan to bring 
the raw milk traders into the regulatory system through training and licensing. Already 
many SSMVs have received licenses and are operating freely without harassment. 
 
While this policy shift towards legalizing informal milk traders is noteworthy, its 
economic impacts on small farmers and consumers in terms of price and/or 
employment have not yet been quantified. This study, therefore, seeks to quantify the 
impacts resulting from this pro-poor policy shift. The analysis aims to quantify the 
direct and indirect impacts on poor producers, market agents and consumers of the on-
going change in the Kenya dairy policy towards legitimizing small-scale informal milk 
market agents. 
 
Most policy analysis studies examine the impact of price changes, particularly the 
economic impact of agricultural price (tax/subsidy) policies (Braverman et al., 1987; 
Braverman and Hammer, 1986). Others examine the impact of food aid (Dorosh et al., 
1995). This study adds to these analyses another dimension that looks at the reduction 
of transaction costs along the supply chain, and how this has an impact on various 
players along the chain. 
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Our hypothesis is that the policy shift towards legalizing raw milk sales will lead to 
lowered transaction costs, which in turn will have an impact on various players along 
the supply chain and the consumers as well. We therefore endeavour to quantify these 
impacts. 
 
1.3 Transaction costs  
Transaction costs are the embodiment of barriers to market participation by resource 
poor smallholders (Holloway et al., 2000). According to Staal et al. (1997), transaction 
costs include the cost of: 
• searching for a partner with whom to exchange,  
• screening potential trading partners to ascertain their trustworthiness,  
• bargaining with potential trading partners (and in some cases officials who can hold 
up trade) to reach an agreement,  
• transferring the product (this typically involves transportation, but could also include 
processing, packaging and securing title),  
• monitoring the agreement to see that its conditions are fulfilled, and  
• enforcing (or seeking damages for any violation of) the exchange agreement. 
 
Distance from the market and poor infrastructure increase transportation costs. On the 
other hand, high marketing margins are mainly due to merchants with local monopoly 
power. Search and recruitment costs are made higher due to imperfect information or 
inadequate access to information. Differential transaction costs among households thus 
stem from asymmetries in access to assets, information, services and remunerative 
markets. In essence, all transaction costs derive from a combination of bounded 
rationality (which reflects both imperfect information and a limited capacity to analyze 
it) and opportunism, which Williamson (1996) defines as “self-interest seeking with 
guile”. 
 
One implication is that the combination of rational choice behaviour and transaction 
costs creates incentives for opportunistic behaviour, resulting in adverse selection and 
moral hazard in transaction, both of which have high costs. The former implies ex ante 
costs of screening out the bad risks among candidates for the transaction while the 
latter implies ex post costs of monitoring, legal action and enforcement. This gives rise 
to the quest for institutions, whether alternative or complementary to the market, that 
place checks on opportunism and reduce transaction costs. 
 
In the dairy industry, transaction costs also increase because raw milk is a highly 
perishable product. Lowering transaction costs would therefore increase the volumes of 
milk traded with economic benefits to traders and producers. Increased volume of 
livestock trade would promote regional trade and integration (Williams et al., 2006).   
 
In Kenya, the failure of KCC created a problem for producers and cooperatives. They 
had to face the uncertainty of unreliable milk outlets. This gave rise to many SSMVs 
who sold raw milk, though the sale of raw milk was illegal in urban areas. The result 
was that the SSMVs faced a different type of transaction cost. Because the sale of raw 
milk in urban areas was illegal, informal milk traders risked being arrested by the 
police and having their milk confiscated and dumped. To avoid this, some would pay 
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bribes to the police or KDB officials. All these amount to high or increased transactions 
costs.  
 
A policy shift towards legalizing the sale of raw milk is likely to reduce these 
transaction costs. Eliminating or lowering these transaction costs should have an 
impact not only on the traders but also on the producers and consumers through a 
change in price and resulting indirect effects. The policy instrument affected is an 
indirect one via reduced transaction costs along the milk marketing channel as a result 
of the policy change.  
 
 
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
In order to assess the economic impact of the legalizing milk trade by informal 
vendors, we utilized a partial equilibrium framework that incorporates the major 
channels involved in milk production, trade and related markets. The relative 
importance of each of these marketing channels is illustrated in figure 1. Direct sales 
by producers to consumers represent the largest share of marketing flows (42 percent), 
with trade via SSMVs comprising 23 percent. Other important flows include sales via 
milk bars and cooperatives for raw milk, while processed milk only accounts for about 
14 percent of total sales. 
 
Figure 1: Marketing chains for marketed milk in Kenya 
 
We can highlight the intuition behind the expected impact of legalizing SSMVs using a 
simplified partial equilibrium representation of these relationships. Consider the three 
main stakeholders in this marketing chain: producers (P), traders (T) and consumers (C). 
Producers sell a share of their production, γ, to consumers, with the remainder, 1 - γ, 
to traders. Consumers, likewise, purchase a portion, δ, direct from producers and the 
remaining 1- δ from traders. 
 
Quantifying the economic impacts of a policy shift towards legalizing informal milk trade in Kenya 
 9
We illustrate these relationships graphically in figure 2 using three supply-demand 
graphs: the top panel shows direct sales from producers to consumers, the middle 
panel sales from producers to traders, and the bottom panel sales from traders to 
consumers. In the figure, pp represents the producer (farm-gate) price, pc is the price 
paid by the consumer, and the vectors X, Y, and Z are miscellaneous parameters 
related to tastes, complements and substitutes; technical parameters; and income for 
consumers, traders, and producers, respectively. 
 
 
Figure 2: Partial equilibrium representation of major markets in the dairy sector 
 
With the change in policy towards the legalization of SSMVs, an important first-round 
effect was a significant decline in various transactions costs incurred by traders. A 
reduction in such costs would increase demand from traders and induce entry into the 
sector. In a partial equilibrium framework, this would entail a rightward shift in 
demand from traders in the producer-trader sector as illustrated in figure 3, as lower 
transaction costs would change the vector Y from its initial value (Y0) to a new level, 
Y1. This would cause an increase in the price paid to producers from PP0 to PP1. Also, 
since input demand for milk by traders is analogous to the supply of milk available 
from traders to consumers (figure 3, bottom panel) there would be a rightward shift in 
the supply curve in the trader-consumer market that would induce a fall in the price 
paid by consumers from PC0 to PC1. Since the profits received by traders can be 
denoted as CTCQPPPC milk −−−= )(π , these effects would cause a decline in the 
marketing margin (PC-PP) received by small traders, which would be offset by greater 
volumes of milk marketed (Qmilk) and lower transactions costs (TC). Such a policy 
change would naturally impact own and related markets as well. 
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Figure 3: Impact of reduced transactions costs on milk traders 
 
 
In order to determine the magnitude of economic impacts in own and related markets, 
a multi-market model according to the method of Rich and Lundberg (2002) was used 
and run in the General Algebraic Modelling System (GAMS). Specific details of the 
model are in Appendix A. The model includes two output markets (milk and maize), 
four input markets (fertilizer, labour, Napier and concentrates) and a housing sector to 
proxy for non-food expenditures. The model distinguishes between three production 
systems in supply (subsistence, major and limited dairy enterprises) and four household 
consumption groups (urban poor, urban non-poor, rural poor, and rural non-poor) to 
examine the distributional impact of reforms to the informal milk sector.   
 
Reforms associated with the legalization of SSMVs were modelled by assuming a 38 
percent reduction between the producer price and the consumer price. This level of 
price reduction was arrived at using data provided by six traders. The traders provided 
data on transaction costs they incurred before the policy change. These costs were 
quantified in terms of bribes to police, discarded milk and confiscated milk cans. We 
then calculated the transaction costs as a percentage of the total market margins 
accruing to traders (total revenues less procurement costs). Ideally, one would directly 
model the impact of reduced transactions costs on trader behaviour, but data 
limitations precluded such an approach. 
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3. DATA AND ESTIMATIONS 
3.1 Consumption data  
Household survey data collected by SDP in 1998 from Nairobi, Nakuru urban and 
Nakuru rural were used to describe household consumption characteristics. The survey 
collected detailed information on the household structure, consumption, prices, 
incomes and housing characteristics among others. The data set thus included 
consumption data on food and non-food items. However, this study only considered 
consumption data on raw milk, whole maize grain and housing.  
 
Raw milk consumed included both raw milk purchased and that produced and 
consumed at home. The same applied to maize grain. Purchase prices for raw milk and 
maize grain were used. Per capita income, expenditure and consumption of the three 
items were also derived from that data set. 
 
The data set consisted of 406 households:  129 rural and 277 urban. The households 
were further classified as poor or non-poor based on a monetary poverty line that 
represents the cost of a basic basket of goods (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2003). The 
poverty line is based on the expenditure required to purchase a food basket that allows 
minimum nutritional requirements to be met. This is set at 2,250 calories per adult 
equivalent per day (AE), in addition to the costs of meeting basic non food needs 
(Government of Kenya, 2000). In Kenya, this poverty line was estimated to be KSh. 
1,239 and KSh. 2,648 per AE per month for rural and urban households, respectively, 
based on data collected in 1997.   
 
Because the income data available in the data set was in terms of income categories 
rather than exact income, total expenditure data was used to calculate per capita 
expenditure and determine the position of the households against the poverty line. 
Based on their position from the poverty line four types of households were analyzed: 
rural poor, rural non-poor, urban poor and urban non-poor. The poor were those 
below the poverty line, whereas the non-poor were those above it. Of the 406 
households, 312 consumed either maize grain or raw milk or both and so the 
estimations were based on these 312 households. 
 
The demand parameters were estimated econometrically following the Almost Ideal 
Demand System (AIDS) as budget shares ( iw ). The estimated demand equations take 
the form: 
 
h
h
hihihihihi P
yPCw lnln ,,,,, ϕφα ++= ∑  
5,...2,1=i  
 
Where hiw ,  is the budget share of the i th good by household h  and y  is the total 
expenditure by household h on the three goods. P  is a price index defined as: 
 
Pln = i
i
i PCw ln∑  
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The parameters are subject to the following restrictions: 
 
∑
i
iα =1 0=∑
i
ihφ  0=∑ ii ϕ  ,0=∑
h
hiφ  hiih φφ =  
 
The AIDS is estimated as a system of demand equations with the above restrictions 
imposed using the Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR). The price and income 
elasticities were derived from the parameter estimates as:  
 
i
i
ii
ii w
E ϕφ −+−= 1 , ,h
i
i
i
ih
ih www
E ϕφ −=   
i
i
i w
ϕη += 1  
 
Expenditure per capita for each household group was calculated by dividing the total 
household expenditure by the number of household members. Tables 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 
show total monthly household expenditure on the three items, monthly per capita 
consumption, expenditure shares, income elasticities and price elasticities, 
respectively. 
 
 
Table 1: Total monthly household expenditure (KSh.) on maize grain, raw milk and 
housing 
Household type No. of 
households 
Maize grain Milk Housing 
  Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Urban poor 51 231      317 201 209 517 286 
Urban non-poor 134 154    270 470   773 2802 6586 
Rural poor 48 334 388 506 666 43 126 
Rural non-poor 79 351 478 901    1154 70 241 
All households 312 244 367 541 848 1313 4504 
 
Among the foods, milk accounted for the greatest expenditure in all household types 
except the urban poor. This result is consistent with that of Argwings-Kodhek et al. 
(2005) where dairy products constituted the largest food expenditure.     
 
 
Table 2: Proportions of expenditure shares 
Household type Maize grain Milk Housing 
Urban poor 0.23        0.20 0.56 
Urban non-poor 0.11  0.23 0.66 
Rural poor 0.41 0.55 0.04 
Rural non-poor 0.28 0.67 0.05 
 
Among urban dwellers, the largest share of their expenditure to was on housing, as 
compared to their rural counterparts whose largest household expenditure was on milk 
followed by maize. Out of the 129 rural households, only 22 respondents paid rent 
with the rest living in their own houses. 
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Table 3: Income elasticities for the three consumption goods 
Household type Maize grain Milk Housing 
Urban poor 1.05 1.0 0.67 
Urban non-poor 1.05 1.49 0.75 
Rural poor 1.2 1.0 0.50 
Rural non-poor 1.12 0.95 0.40 
All households 1.11 1.15 0.71 
 
The income elasticities for maize grain were high. However, they are close to one 
which, theoretically, is the upper limit for staples. The income elasticities for milk are 
essentially in line with what other studies have obtained. Staal et al. (2003) found the 
income elasticity of raw milk to be 1.192. 
 
Table 4: Price demand elasticities 
Price/commodity Maize grain Milk Housing 
Maize grain price -1.04 -0.07 0.02 
Raw milk price -0.04 -0.97 -0.01 
Housing price -0.18 -0.18 -0.70 
 
The price demand elasticities are essentially similar to what other studies have found. 
For example, Dorosh et al. (1995) found an own price white maize elasticity of -0.85. 
 
 
3.2 Production data 
Basic production data on producer prices, outputs and inputs were taken from the 
REPEAT (Research on Poverty, Environment and Agricultural Technologies) data set 
collected by a team of researchers from the National Graduate Institute for Policy 
Studies (GRIPS) in Japan, Tegemeo Institute of Egerton University, the World Agro-
forestry Centre (ICRAF), and the International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI). 
 
The data extracted included output levels and levels of input use for maize and milk. 
The inputs considered were labour and fertilizer for maize; and labour, concentrates 
and Napier/stover for milk. 
 
The sample households were characterized into three production systems according 
the characterization by the Trajectories of Change project (http://www.trajectories.org). 
The three production systems were: subsistence farmers with limited dairy; farmers 
with major dairy activities and export cash crops; and farmers with limited dairy 
activities and export cash crops. To link the production to the consumption data, it was 
assumed that households in the subsistence production systems were the “rural poor” 
and those in the other two production systems were the “rural rich”. None of the 
households in the REPEAT data set were located in urban areas. 
 
Land for both commodities was assumed to be given (fixed). A log linear profit function 
was used to derive both the output supply and the input demand equations. The output 
equation for maize and milk is thus represented in a log linear form as a function of the 
output and input prices as shown below: 
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( )pjoutpLn ,  = pj ,α  +  +∑ )( ,, pj
j
pj PPLnβ )( ,,, pi
i
pji PILn∑δ  
 
Where pjPP ,  are the output prices differentiated by production systems and piPI ,  is a 
vector of input prices in each production system. 
 
The input demand equations are similarly represented in a log linear form as a function 
of the output and the input prices as shown below. 
 ( )pjiinpLn ,,  = pji ,,α  + pji ,,η  +)( , piPILn )( ,,, pjpji PPLn∑γ   
Where as before piPI , are the input prices in the different production systems and pjPP ,  
are the output prices in the different production systems. 
 
The input demand and output supply functions are estimated to give the production 
parameters. The beta (β ) and the delta (δ ) coefficients represent the price elasticities 
in the output equations, and η  and γ  represent the price elasticities in the input 
demand equations. The estimations were done using the Seemingly Unrelated 
Regression (SUR) as a system and with symmetry conditions imposed. 
 
What follows are the results of the estimations that were used to parameterize the 
model. Table 5 shows the production levels for maize and milk in the base data. Table 
7 shows the output supply elasticities with respect to output prices. Table 8 shows the 
output supply elasticities with respect to input prices.  
 
Table 5: Production levels (total annual output) for maize and milk by production 
system 
Production system Maize (kg) Milk (kg) 
Subsist 4161 2561 
Mdairy 8720 5319 
Ldairy 6567 3953 
Subsist: subsistence farmers with limited dairy 
Mdairy: major dairy activities with export cash crops 
Ldairy: limited dairy activities with export cash crops 
 
Table 6: Output supply elasticities with respect to output prices 
Production system Maize price Milk price 
Subsist maize 0.83 0.31 
Mdairy maize 0.17 -0.16 
Ldairy maize 0.74 -0.05 
Subsist milk 0.31 0.35 
Mdairy milk -0.16 0.40 
Ldairy milk -0.05 0.34 
 
Own price elasticities were all positive as theoretically expected. The cross price 
elasticities were positive in the subsistence production system and negative in the other 
two systems. In the subsistence with limited dairy production system, maize and milk 
complemented each other. It has been noted that in subsistence production systems, 
sale of dairy products like milk provides cash that is used to purchase inputs such as 
fertilizer for crops (Bebe, 2003). In the non-subsistence production systems, farmers are 
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possibly more commercial-oriented and allocate resources based on the profitability of 
the commodities. Hence the competition for available resources, particularly land and 
labour. 
 
Table 7: Output supply elasticities with respect to input prices  
Production system Fertilizer Labour Napier Concentrates 
Subsist maize -0.94      -0.32 na na 
Mdairy maize -0.29 -0.01 na na 
Ldairy maize -0.14    -0.03 na na 
Subsist milk na -0.04 -0.08   -0.13 
Mdairy milk na -0.34 -0.19 -0.07 
Ldairy milk na -0.03 -0.07       -0.14 
na: not applicable 
 
The output elasticities with respect to input prices were generally in line with 
theoretical expectations. It was however not clear why the maize output elasticity with 
respect to the price of fertilizer was much higher in the subsistence production system. 
 
Table 8: Input demand elasticities with respect to input prices  
Input by production system Fertilizer Labour Napier Concentrates 
Subsist fertilizer - 1.01 - 0.03 0 0 
Mdairy fertilizer - 1.10 0.09 0 0 
Ldairy fertilizer - 0.56 0.06 0 0 
Subsist labour - 0.03 - 0.39 - 0.04 0.47 
Mdairy labour 0.09 - 0.31 - 0.08 0.03 
Ldairy labour 0.06 - 0.03 - 0.06 0.12 
Subsist Napier 0 - 0.04 - 0.94 -0.13 
Mdairy Napier 0 - 0.08 - 0.13 -0.18 
Ldairy Napier 0 - 0.06 - 0.12 -0.09 
Subsist concentrates 0 0.47  -0.13 - 1.36 
Mdairy concentrates 0 0.03  -0.18 - 1.53 
Ldairy concentrates 0 0.12  -0.09 - 2.33 
 
The input demand elasticities with respect to input prices in Table 8 were generally in 
line with theoretical expectations. Napier and labour are complements as labour is 
required to cut and process the Napier. The input demand elasticities with respect to 
output prices are in line with theoretical expectations (Table 9). However, except for 
fertilizer, the responses (elasticities) are very low. 
 
Table 9: Input demand elasticities with respect to output prices  
Input by production system Maize Milk 
Subsist fertilizer 0.94 0 
Mdairy fertilizer 0.29 0 
Ldairy fertilizer 0.14 0 
Subsist labour 0.32 0.04 
Mdairy labour 0.01 0.34 
Ldairy labour 0.03 0.03 
Subsist Napier 0 0.08 
Mdairy Napier 0 0.19 
Ldairy Napier 0 0.07 
Subsist concentrates 0 0.13 
Mdairy concentrates 0 0.07 
Ldairy concentrates 0 0.14 
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3.3 Market margins (transaction costs) data 
Data on the market margins (transaction costs incurred by the traders before the dairy 
policy change) were obtained by interviewing a sample of six traders on the before-
and-after scenarios. Specifically, we sought information on amounts of milk lost due to 
confiscation by police, amount of milk that went sour, amount of bribes given and the 
number and cost of cans confiscated before and after the change in dairy policy.  
 
The major losses were in terms of the costs of confiscated milk and milk containers. Of 
the six traders interviewed, only one used to pay bribes regularly, and another had paid 
a bribe only once. The trader who used to pay bribes did not experience harassment 
from the authorities. Table 10 shows the average level of transaction costs in terms of 
quantity and value. None of the traders indicated that their milk went sour. 
 
 
Table 10: Milk volumes traded and losses incurred by milk traders before and after the 
dairy policy shift 
 Item  Before  After  
Average daily milk sales (litres) 62.5 116 
Price of milk (KSh./litre) 19.9 21.9 
Value of daily milk sales (KSh.) 1244 2549 
Change in daily milk sales (litres)  +53.3 
Value of increased milk (KSh.)  +1194 
Monthly milk poured/lost due to 
harassment (litres) 
142 0 
Value of lost milk (KSh.) 2661 0 
Amount of bribe given in one month 
(KSh.) 
41.7 0 
Value of cans lost in one month 598 0 
 
After the change in the dairy policy, the average daily amount of milk sold per trader 
increased by 85.3 percent, from 62.3 to 116 litres. When all the costs are considered, 
this represents a 38 per cent decrease in market margins. It is important to note that the 
monthly bribe of KSh. 41.7 is consistent with the results of a wider (public health) 
survey. 
 
 
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
The analysis is according to the multi-market model described in appendix A and 
considers a 38 per cent change in marketing margins between producer and consumer 
prices. We thus examined the impact of this change in consumer and producer prices, 
on agricultural incomes and levels of household production, consumption and 
incomes. Tables 11and 12 show the effects the reduced trader market margins on input 
and output prices. 
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Table 11: Effects of a thirty eight percent decrease in market margins on the consumer 
prices  
Commodity Base consumer price New consumer price Percentage change in 
consumer price  
Maize 14.1 14.2 0.92 
Milk 23.4 20.2 -13.5 
Housing 1.312 1.362 3.81 
Labour 130.9 131.4 0.42 
Fertilizer 29.7 29.7 0 
Napier 7.15 7.18 0.36 
Concentrates 12.98 12.98 0 
 
The reduced market margins resulted in a 13.5 percent decline in the consumer price 
of milk. This result is consistent with our hypothesis that a reduction in the transaction 
costs will not only have an impact on the traders but on the related agents (producers 
and consumers) too. A decrease in the market margins for the traders is likely to make 
milk trade more lucrative and provide incentives for more traders to become involved 
in the milk market, hence a shift in the trader supply curve to the right. Because the 
consumer demand curve does not shift, the consumer price is reduced (see the 
theoretical framework). 
 
The change in the market margin resulted in only a slight change in the consumer and 
producer prices of maize (less than 1 per cent). The price of housing was found to 
increase by 3.81 per cent. This may be because the reduced price of milk enabled 
households to save on expenditures on milk and use the savings on other commodities 
such as housing.  
 
For the non-tradable inputs (Napier and labour) the reduction in market margins 
resulted in a less than 1 per cent increase in the prices of both inputs. However, the 
prices of fertilizer and of concentrates did not change because they are fixed to the 
world market prices. 
 
Table 12: Effect of a thirty eight percent decrease in market margins on producer price 
Commodity Base producer price  New producer price Percentage change in 
producer price 
Maize 12.6 12.7 0.92 
Milk 15.1 15.1 0 
Housing 1.313 1.363 3.81 
Labour 119 119.5 0.42 
Fertilizer 27 27 0 
Napier 6.50 6.52 0.36 
Concentrates 11.8 11.8 0 
 
As explained in the theoretical framework, the decline in market margins should also 
lead to an increase in the producer price. However, the output price of milk did not 
change because milk was treated as an exportable good in the model and its producer 
price fixed to the world market price. This is a shortcoming of the model. There was 
not enough data to model the behaviour of the milk traders and hence it was not 
possible to vary the producer price of milk based on market forces. However, this 
result reflects reality in that a reduction in transaction costs is most likely, in the short 
run, to have a bigger impact on consumer prices than on producer prices. In a 
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competitive market environment it is plausible that the first-round effect of reduced 
transaction costs is for the traders to pass this cost reduction on to consumers in terms 
of lower retail prices because the marginal costs of trading are also reduced. 
 
Table 13: Effect of a thirty eight percent decrease in the traders’ market margins on the 
supply of commodities 
Production 
system 
Maize Milk 
 Base 
production 
New 
production 
Percentage 
change 
Base 
production 
New 
production 
Percentage 
change 
Subsist 124.852 125.633 0.63 322.082 322.848 0.24 
Mdairy  787.034 788.222 0.15 1174.191 1169.715 -0.38 
Ldairy  1693.418 1704.665 0.66 2519.593 2517.505 -0.08 
All households 2605.304 2618.519 0.51 4015.866 4010.068 -0.14 
 
Reduced marketing margins saw in a slight increase in the production of maize and a 
slight decrease in the production of milk (Table 13). The increase in maize production 
is mainly in the subsistence with limited dairy and the limited dairy with export crops 
production systems. Maize output in the major dairy with export crops production 
system increased the least. This is mainly because of the nature of the maize output 
response to price in the different production systems. Outputs in the subsistence system 
and the limited dairy system are more responsive to output price (have higher price 
elasticities). Maize output in the major dairy production system is the least responsive 
to maize output price (has the lowest elasticity). 
 
Milk production in the subsistence with limited dairy production system increased by 
0.24 per cent but this increase was offset by the production decrease in the other two 
production systems, particularly in the major dairy with export crops. Given that the 
producer price of milk is fixed, the reduction in production is driven mainly from the 
input side, particularly labour and Napier whose prices increased by 0.42 and 0.36 per 
cent, respectively. 
 
Similar to maize production, the observed scenario between the production systems is 
again influenced by the observed elasticities. Milk output in the major dairy production 
system is more responsive to the prices of labour (η = -0.19) and Napier (η = -0.34) 
compared to the other two production systems (Table 8). The increase in the prices of 
labour and Napier results in a decrease in the purchase of these inputs mainly in the 
major dairy productions system leading to a bigger decline in milk production in that 
system. 
 
Table 14: Effect of a thirty eight percent decrease in traders’ market margin on 
consumption levels of commodities by different household types (percentage change) 
Household type Maize  Milk  Housing  
Urban non-poor 0.14 14.99 -0.18 
Urban poor 0.14 14.99 -0.18 
Rural non-poor 0.52 15.36 0.16 
Rural poor 0.51 15.34 0.13 
All households 0.51 15.35 0 
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Results of the impact of the reduction in transaction costs on the consumption levels 
are shown in Table 14. They show that the biggest impact of the reduction in the 
market margins was in the consumption levels of raw milk, mainly because of the 
impact it has on the consumer price of milk. Consumption of raw milk increased for all 
household types by about 15 per cent. 
 
In terms of welfare effects, this has two implications. Firstly, the increase in the 
consumption of milk particularly in the rural areas will lead to improved nutrition, 
particularly among children. Secondly, a decrease in the consumer price of milk will 
have an impact of the real incomes of the households in that they will require less 
money to purchase a given bundle of goods. This impact will be highest for rural 
households where milk forms a high percentage of their expenditures (Table 2).  
 
The 38 per cent reduction in market margins resulted in a slight increase in 
consumption of maize grain among all household types, though this increase was 
slightly higher in rural households. This was because the incomes of rural households 
increased slightly despite the increase in the consumer price of maize while the 
incomes of the urban households remained the same. 
 
Table 15: Effect of a thirty eight percent decrease in the market margin on household 
income (percentage change) 
Household type Change in household income Change in agricultural income 
Urban non-poor 0 0 
Urban poor 0 0 
Rural non-poor 0.34 0.41 
Rural poor 0.31 0.63 
 
The reduction in the market margins resulted in only a small increase in household 
income for the rural households (Table 15). This increase was from the slight increase 
in agricultural income from increased maize production and price (Tables 12 and 13). 
With the price of milk fixed and that of some of the inputs increasing, little impact can 
be expected on the producer side of the economy. Moreover, empirical evidence 
suggests that short-run supply response tends to be relatively small partly due to lack of 
investment in other public institutions such as extension and infrastructure. Ruijs et al. 
(2004) found that although investing in road infrastructure to reduce transportation 
costs was beneficial, a clear improvement in food trade was only possible if market 
institutions were reformed. The urban households are not involved in agricultural 
production and hence their incomes do not change. 
 
5. CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATION 
 
The most noticeable impact of a policy shift towards legalizing informal milk trade is a 
reduction of the consumer price of milk by over 13 per cent. This in turn is likely to 
lead to increased milk consumption by about 15 per cent among both urban and rural 
households. This should lead to improved nutrition, particularly for the rural poor and 
especially children.  
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In addition, the reduced consumer price of milk will have an impact on the real 
incomes of consumers particularly those households where raw milk forms a large 
share of their expenditures. This is because they will spend less money to purchase a 
particular food package compared to when the transactions costs were higher. 
 
Another important indirect impact it has on employment. Lower transaction costs make 
informal milk trade more lucrative, and hence more people are likely to join this 
business thereby creating various employment opportunities along the milk market 
chain.  
 
The impact of the reduced transaction costs on the producers is small. However, there 
is an indirect impact on real incomes via the reduced consumer price of milk. 
 
The results of this study imply that reduction in transaction costs associated with 
informal milk marketing is an effective policy that can be used to increase the welfare 
of poor consumers particularly in the short run. However, for such a policy to have a 
substantial impact on producers, long-term approaches should be considered and 
accompanied by investments in technology and other institutions.  
 
6. RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
There is need to collect more data, particularly on the behaviour of the informal milk 
agents, so that they can be explicitly modelled and the producer price of milk allowed 
to vary in the model based on markets forces and the resulting behaviour of the 
different players. This will lead to an increase of the impact the policy will have on 
producer prices and incomes. 
 
In the current multi-market model, only the maize grain and housing markets were 
assumed to be directly or indirectly affected by changes in the milk market, and hence 
they were the only ones modelled alongside that of raw milk. However, there are other 
markets (e.g. pasteurized milk and maize meal markets) which are likely to be affected 
by changes in the policies on the marketing of raw milk. Again these were not 
modelled because of lack of sufficient data on them. There is need to collect the 
missing data and include them in the model. 
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Appendix A 
Overview of the multi-market model 
The model used in this analysis is based on the generic multi-market platform 
developed by Rich and Lundberg (2002). In the model, there are five blocks of 
equations: prices, supply (and input demand), consumption, income and equilibrium. 
The price block relates producer and consumer prices in the domestic market and the 
relationships between world and domestic prices. The supply block characterizes 
production relationships in terms of the production of crops and milk and demand for 
inputs. The consumption block details household demand for different consumption 
goods. The income block defines total household income as the sum of agricultural 
and non-agricultural income, while the equilibrium condition equates supply plus net 
imports to household and input demand. The following is a listing of the variables used 
in the model: 
 
C = all commodities (maize, milk, housing, labour, fertilizer, Napier and concentrates) 
I = food and non-food products (i.e. non-input commodities, maize, milk and housing) 
IA = food products only (maize and milk) 
IM = importable products (fertilizer and concentrates) 
IX = world price for importable commodities 
NF = non-food products (housing) 
IN = inputs (fertilizer, labour, Napier and concentrates) 
P = production systems (subsistence, major dairy activities, limited dairying activities) 
H = households (urban non-poor, urban poor, rural non-poor, rural poor) 
 
PCc   Consumer price for commodity c 
PPc   Producer price for commodity c 
RMARGc  Margin from rest-of-world (ROW) to border for commodity c 
IMARGc Margin from consumption area to border for commodity c 
MARGc  Margin from producing area to consumption area for commodity c 
PMim   Import price for importable commodities 
PXix  World price for importable commodities 
tmc   Import tariff on commodity c 
er   USD-KSh exchange rate 
PSCRp,ia  Supply of food products (ia) by production system p  
SCRia   Total supply of food products 
SIN0in   Total supply of input products (fixed) 
SHSE0nf  Total supply of housing (fixed) 
PDINPp,in,ia  Input demand of input in by production system p for crop ia  
DINPin,ia  Total input demand of input in for crop ia 
DFOODH,,i  Demand for food and non-food product i by household group h 
CONSi  Total demand for food and non-food product i 
Mc   Net imports of commodity c 
YHH   Total income of household group h 
YHNAG0H  Non-agricultural income of household group h (fixed) 
YHAGRPH  Agricultural income of rural poor 
YHAGRRH  Agricultural income of rural rich 
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Price block 
The price block consists of three equations that relate producer and consumer prices in 
domestic markets and domestic prices to world prices. Producer prices are linked to 
consumer prices through the use of an exogenously specified margin (MARG) that is 
commodity-specific. This margin reflects various types of transactions costs that arise 
between the farm-gate and point of end sale, including transportation costs, mark-ups, 
etc. In the model, such margins also incorporate transactions costs in distribution 
encountered by different agents such as traders. 
 
)1( c
c
c MARG
PC
PP +=       (1) 
 
In the model, all products except for fertilizer, milk and concentrates are assumed to be 
non-tradable. Thus, equilibrium in such markets arises from the intersection of supply 
and demand in domestic markets. For tradable goods, the consumer price is fixed to 
the world price for importables, whereas the producer price is fixed to the world price 
for exportable goods. These prices are adjusted by import margins, tariffs etc. through 
the following two price relationships:  
 
)1(* imimim IMARGPMPC +=      (2) 
)1(*)1(** imimimim tmRMARGerPWPM ++=   (3) 
 
Supply block 
The model distinguishes between three production systems: subsistence farmers with 
limited dairy activities (SUBSIST); farmers with export crops and major dairy activities 
(MDAIRY); and farmers with intensified crop/export crops with limited dairy activities 
(LDAIRY). Each production system produces maize and milk through the use of 
commodity-specific inputs. Milk production requires the use of labour, Napier and 
concentrates, while maize uses just fertilizer and labour. Supply for each production 
system is modelled as a double-log system based on the prices of inputs and outputs, 
with the total supply of maize and milk simply the sum over each production system. 
The beta and the gamma coefficients represent the price elasticities for output and 
input prices, respectively. 
 ( )iapPSCR ,ln  = iaps ,α  +  +∑ )(ln,, ij
ij
ijiap
s PPβ )ln(,, in
in
iniap
s PC∑γ     (4)      
∑=
p
iapia PSCRSCR ,        (5) 
 
Likewise, the equations for input demand are represented in a double-log format, 
based on the production system and crop that uses each input. Input demand is a 
function of input demand consumer prices and output supply producer prices. Total 
input demand for each input by crop is the sum over each production system. 
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  ( )iainpPDINP ,,ln  = iainpI ,,α  + ∑
iin
iaiininp
I
,,,β  +)ln( iinPC )ln(,,, ij
ij
ijiainp
I PP∑γ   (6) 
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iainpiain PDINPDINP ,,,       (7) 
Consumption block 
The model differentiates between four types of households: urban poor (URBPOOR), 
urban rich (URBRICH), rural poor (RURPOOR), and rural rich (RURRICH). Households 
consume both food products (maize and milk) and one non-food product, housing, that 
serves to proxy non-food expenditures. Consumption relationships are modelled as a 
double-log system based on the prices of food and non-food items and household 
income, using elasticities generated from the data mentioned previously.   
 
∑ ++=
j
H
D
IHj
D
HJI
D
IHIH YHPCDFOOD )log()ln(* ,,,,, γβα   (8) 
 ∑=
H
IHI DFOODCONS ,       (9) 
 
Income block 
Three equations characterize income in the model. Total income is the sum of 
agricultural and non-agricultural income; the latter is assumed to be exogenous. We 
assume that only rural households earn agricultural income, defined as the sum of total 
revenue from crop production less input use. For rural poor households, their income 
is based on the production from subsistence activities, while the income of rural rich 
households is based on the activities of major and limited dairy production systems. 
 
HHHH YHNAGYHAGRRYHAGRPYH 0++=    (10) 
∑∑∑ −=
in ia
iainsubsistin
ia
iasubsistia
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PDINPPCPSCRPP
YHAGRP
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*
1000
* ,,,  (11) 
 
              ∑∑∑ −=
in ia
iainmdairyin
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RURRICH
PDINPPCPSCRPP
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∑∑∑ −+
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*
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* ,,,        (12) 
Equilibrium block  
An equilibrium condition closes the system that relates total supply plus net imports to 
household plus feed demand. Note that the supply of non-imported inputs and housing 
is fixed. 
 
iainIcnfinia DINPCONSMSHSESINSCR ,00 +=+++   (13) 
 
The model is programmed in GAMS (General Algebraic Modelling System) using a 
non-linear programming solver (CONOPT). 
